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Abstract—Over the past decades, the web is always one of
the most popular targets of hackers. Today, along with the
popular usage of open sources such as Wordpress and Joomla,
the explosion of the vulnerabilities in such frameworks causes
the websites using them to face numerous security threats.
Unfortunately, many clients and small companies may not be
aware of these serious security threats and call a rescuer only
when the website is hacked, compromised, or blocked by the
search engines. In this paper, we present an effective counter
against such threats, including monetization attempts in the less
valuable targets such as small websites.
Index Terms—Web security attacks, Web vulnerabilities, Web
protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Internet Live Stat [1], the total number of
online websites has already soared over 1.9 billion and is
steadily increasing. The most popular content management
systems (CMS) installed on such websites are PHP-based
frameworks such as Wordpress and Joomla, which take, as
of Dec. 2018, 59% and 6% of the market share [2], [3].
Note that a large number of those websites belongs to small
companies and individuals that may have few motivations to
pay thousands of dollars for security maintenance services.
Also, due to the development cost, the owners, even the
developers they hire, may prefer available CMS such as
Joomla to accelerate the deployment. However, that presents
serious security threats, in which the website can be the target
of large scale exploitation campaigns. For example, an attacker
can exploit many websites with the same vulnerabilities of the
same framework. The hardware-based firewalls such as [4] and
scrubbing centers such as CloudFlare may have few chances
to reach the clients who are only willing to pay several dollars
per month for basic web services in shared hosting. On the
other hand, the open source firewall such as Mod Security [8]
can be available in shared hosting but have few mechanisms
to prevent all the attacks against the vulnerabilities of CMS
core and its add-ons. As usual, the lack of security protection
and maintenance in these websites plays an important role to
motivate the cybercriminals to attack and launch illegitimate
activities. In this case, those are the monetization attempts.
The era of all for the money
A long time ago, attacking a web can be a demonstration
of hacking skills, e.g., for script kiddies. Then there are
increasingly sophisticated attacks to steal the client data of
online shopping websites, although such important systems
are often reinforced by good solutions and the owner may
not be interested in using open sources. Nowadays, while
the small websites such as personal blogs may have little
valuable information to steal, we have discovered a campaign,
in which attackers have abused the hacked websites to make
money. Mining cryptocurrency is an example. Coinhive allows
website owners to make use of their website visitors’ CPU
to mine the Monero cryptocurrency [9]. Following that, the
attacker targets to inject mining scripts (cryptojacking) to as
many victims as possible and then launch long-term silent
monetization campaigns [6].
That is not the end of the monetization chain of the attacker.
The malicious scripts in an injected website can be used to
force the visitors to redirect to a fake address, force them
to install given shareware software, open pop-up ads and so
on. Attracted by high CPC (cost per click) rates [10], the
attacker can hijack the websites, replace the content of a page
and entice the visitors to click on the fake links [6]. We
have also found such silent attempts in building a farm web
for phishing and ads campaign through an effort of rescuing
injected websites.
In summary, this article makes the following contributions:
• We discuss the detail of the vulnerabilities exploitation,
monetization attempts, and Web-server abuse. This at-
tempt is driven by the security characteristics of the
websites based on the cheap hosting but accounts for the
majority of web users.
• We unveil a deep insight into our cleaning and attack pre-
vention mechanism to crack down the attempts of abusing
cheap-hosting Web-servers for monetization attacks.
• We practically implement the proposed system and rescue
several websites and the servers which were hacked and
abused.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II covers the detail of those attack attempts. Section III
then discuss a systematic approach to clean and prevent such
attacks. Section IV-B covers the implementation in practice.
To conclude, we discuss the goal of the review in Section V.
II. ATTACK TACTICS AND EXAMPLES
A. Attack tactics
Exploiting the vulnerabilities to compromise the website
is often the first step but important for further sophisticated
campaigns such as phishing and monetization. There are
several options to attack a web; however, the most common
approach is taking advantage of exploiting zero-day and well-
known vulnerabilities. Through the system log in the rescue
website, we have found that the attacker used an automated
exploitation script to try various attacks (as illustrated in
Fig. 1) was successful with a famous vulnerability of SQLi
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2in Joomla Core 3.7.x in a website and a remote execution
code vulnerability in updating the style of the default template
protostar in another site.
In practice, designing an auto-attack script with many
exploitation patterns [11] is one of the most effective methods
to increase the probability of a successful attack. Besides, the
reality of many websites using the old versions of CMS core is
not uncommon, and this fragmentation makes the developers
harder to maintain security patches for many vulnerabilities
at the same time. Another potential attack is to exploit the
vulnerabilities of the add-ons or additional components in-
stalled to the CMS core, e.g., Wordpress Super Cache. The
nulled commercial scripts also account for a significant part
in worsening the security of a website. The newbie developers
often use these shared scripts for saving development cost, but
may not be aware of the malicious codes plugged inside.
The final target of the attacks mentioned above is mostly
to upload a shell-code or attack script and then clone it to
many folders of the web directory, normally with the possible
unharmed names such as functions.php and libraries.php. A
shell-code is an obfuscated script to be used to create a
backdoor for the attacker’s future access and do what he
orders. Fig.2 illustrates the example of such shell-code. For the
attack, in an effort of hiding the real IP address, the attacker
uses many C&C servers with different IP addresses from many
countries to launch the attacks as well as deliver the updates
to this shell.
Fig. 1. Illustration of an attack with many exploitation calls, including
targeting potential add-ons installed on the CMS, if any.
Fig. 2. Illustration of an obfuscated shell-code
After having a shell-code or an attack script on the website,
the attacker has many options in launching further abuses to
the web servers [5], [7]. In our case, we reveal three examples
of such exploitations as follows.
B. Cryptojacking
Coinhive first introduced the crypto mining script function,
a service that allows website owners to make use of their
website visitors CPUs to mine the Monero cryptocurrency [9].
Coinhive introduced the crypto mining script as an alternative
to placing ads on a website. The hacker often selects the
cryptocurrency Monero for running crypto mining scripts
due to its CPU-friendly hashing algorithm. Moreover, this
cryptocurrency is anonymous and secure nature. In our case,
the hacker injected several packed javascript scripts for the
mining purpose with confusing names such as jquery.min.js,
as shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. An example of a crypto mining script
While Monero is one of the first choices in this exploitation;
other cryptocurrencies can be used as part of a crypto mining
script too. The mining scripts can be interrupted if the visitors
close their browsers; however, with small pop-ups (the user
may not notice), the mining script is still running. To deal
with this kind of attack, a possible approach is to find and
clean all compromised codes or install the crypto mining script
blockers. The detail of the first approach presents in the next
section.
C. Phishing attack
The phishing attack is one of the most popular attacks and
the target of many kinds of research and public anti-phishing
3scanning services such as Google Safe Browsing and Phishing
tank [13]. Besides active scanning from these crawlers to
detect the phishing websites, the anti-phishing services can
rely on the manual reports of volunteers. However, that report
is not always timely. In practice, the attacks often got caught
when there is a significant increase in network traffic or the
browser and search engines block the site.
With newly infected websites in hand, the attacker can care-
fully design a suitable phishing tactic to maximize efficiency.
An example of the simple phishing tactic illustrated in Fig. 4
Fig. 4. An example of simple phishing tactic through faking the login form
of the Bank of America
Fig. 5. Fake login page of the Bank of America website at the time of this
writing. It may be trivial for the attacker to make a change to the page that
follows the updates of the bank site. (the access link can be seen in Fig. 4)
On the other hand, the attacker can launch a PayPal Phishing
using JavaScript redirect [14] in the online shopping-cart
websites to capture credit card information. Even that, we
found a malicious code tried to replace the domain name of
the payment gateway in the API library. The other kind of
popular phishing attacks found in our injected websites is to
harass the visitors with warnings (adware), as illustrated in
Fig. 6, or auto download the files with a virus inside.
D. Fraud ads campaign
One of the most profitable industry is online advertising,
in which Google accounts for the majority of click ads. The
Fig. 6. (left)Illustration of a popup ads to warn the visitors for slowing PC
and suggest to download a speedup PC software; (right) Illustration of an
adware to guide for download PC Fixer, a fake program
high profit of CPC keywords [10] motivates the attacker to take
advantage of loopholes to fraud the ads. While the advertisers
always try to fix the loopholes and ignore the fraud ads, many
fraud tricks may be not easy to detect, including the following
one. First, due to having full remote access the web server (via
the plugged shell-code), the attacker can analyze the available
sitemap of the website and replace it with a manufactured
version. Without frequent checking, the owner may not know
this change. For the sites verified Google Sitemap, the attacker
can periodically update the sitemap with their links and thus
redirect the search content with their designed keywords.
An example of such replacement can be seen in Fig. 7,
where the attack bot generates several random links. The cy-
bercriminals are often interested in creating links and content
with profitable keywords such as pharma. The keywords and
the click results of such a campaign can be seen via Google
Console, as shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, respectively. According
to our analysis, that campaign created tremendous traffic in a
short time. That may not only potentially benefit the attackers
pocket but also attract attention. In this case, that is us.
Fig. 7. An example of the sitemap updated by the attacker.
Finally, the most fear of the owners is that the search engines
block their websites, as illustrated in Fig.9. To restore these
websites, the owners need to clean up (or hire a developer to
do) first and then request a review to the anti-phishing services,
4Fig. 8. The keywords and click results of the campaign (monitored in an
hour)
e.g., via Google Webmaster. It may take days to verify the
whole process, and folks may not want this situation to recur.
Fig. 9. Deceptive warning for visiting the website.
III. CLEAN AND ATTACK PREVENTION MECHANISM
For the small websites, it is infeasible to require high-end
security protection such as [4], primarily due to the economic
reason. If the malicious scripts inject a site, the fastest way
to restore the system function of the site is to use a backup
version. The hosting providers can support a daily backup, but
the owner must often pay an extra fee. In the case of having
a backup of the latest version (due to no many changes to
the site for a long time), it is possible to restore the original
state when the website is stable. However, we argue that
the backup tactic is only a temporary solution and does not
solve the root problem because we cannot entirely guarantee
whether the original version is malware-free. In this case,
cleaning the injected files, i.e., removing the malicious codes,
maybe the best and the most economical. Trusting the tactic,
we deploy two steps to clean and enforce affordable security
protection on the website. Note that our system can directly
run on shared hosting without requiring additional components
such as specific hardware and a dedicated server. The primary
functions of the system are illustrated in Fig.10.
Fig. 10. The main functions of the security protection system
The first module consists of three separate functions: (1)
isolate the website (put it to the maintenance mode or require
a special link with given code to login to the website) to
analyze and clean malicious codes; (2) check the security
configuration of the web server such as unsafe PHP function
(e.g., shell exec) and directory permission (3) activate the
security checking (detection) and the prevention engine. We
only switch the website back to the production mode after
completing all (1), (2), and (3). Intuitively, the three tasks are
likely to separate in function but designed to run together si-
multaneously. The first task is essential to remove all malicious
codes and stop broadcasting the phishing or mining scripts.
The second is used to properly configure and reinforce the
server security setting from potential harm, while the primary
duty of the last one is to prevent the new cycles of the attacks.
While the first module is designed to defend against the
potential attacks from infiltrating the system, the second
module is an independent script which periodically checks the
behavior of the scripts on the server such as creating irregular
links and files. The periodic check can be set by a cron job
in shared hosting or a scheduler if the dedicated server is
supported. Due to the intrinsic characteristic of the event-
driven Web technology, verifying the request (the first module)
is the passive approach to resist the compromised attacks.
Meanwhile, the second module pro-actively keeps an eye on
the system activity. This extensive monitoring is necessary
because the granted Web requests (bypass the first modules
check) can be potentially malicious ones and scheduled to
abuse the server.
5A. Clean up the injected website
To perform the cleanup task on an injected website, we first
lock the whole unauthorized interaction from the Internet to
the site. By turning into the maintenance mode, the risk of
illegal communication such as spreading malicious codes to
the visitors and storming email scams will be declined. Next,
to detect malicious files, our system performs a file integrity
check and signature-based scanning. The files in the fresh
CMS core is first hashed and then a further check on the files
of the injected website. Note that we cannot trust the code of
the additional components, and so they are not hashed. In the
check, if there is a file that does not match the hash code of
the same file in the original core, it can be a malicious script.
Meanwhile, another scanning is also launched on these files
but using regex patterns, including variable obfuscation ( as
shown in Fig. 11. If found any pattern in those files, to be safe,
the files will be blocked in execution and wait for a manual
check by the administrator. Although scanning the integrity
of CMS files may face a little challenge if the CMS core has
been heavily modified to satisfy the new features that were not
initially available on the website, we found that the scan with
regex patterns (also namely signatures) is incredibly effective
to support that missing part. The patterns we used in searching
such common malware can be found in our repository [21].
Fig. 11. Illustration of hashing code for the file integrity check and regex
patterns for searching common malware.
B. Reinforce the server security setting
The server security setting plays a critical role to signifi-
cantly reduce the exploitation of a new cycle of the attacks.
While several hosting providers may have a default policy to
turn off the modules which cause potential security risks such
as shell exec, popen, proc open and allow url include, we
can also do the same work through creating a custom php.ini
and .htaccess in the root folder of the website. The setting
of the website database such as the default admin or weak
passwords are checked as well. Besides, the session lifetime
and insecure permissions of file and directories are scanned
and corrected with safe values. Note that activating HTTPS,
SEO URLs, caching by default and periodically cleaning the
temporary folder also definitely help to secure the website.
C. Attack Prevention
The next important task is to detect new cycles of the
attack attempts from the incoming Web requests and prevent
them. Before conducting what is inside the Web requests, we
first need to check whether the senders IP address is in any
public blacklist. We do that through sending an IP validation
request to the available servers of Tornevall DNS Blacklist,
Spamhaus DNSBL, and Google Safe Browsing. Based on the
return value, we consider the next conducting, e.g., blocking
the access if that is the IP of a spam server. If the IP is
valid, we perform extensive scanning on the received data
(POST/GET) using the signatures similar to those of the clean-
up process. Any suspicious access classified by this scan is
temporarily blocked and waits for a further manual check by
the administrator. In addition, a security warning page is also
set to display. That will allow the requester to know what
happens with their requests (e.g., in the case of false-positive
detection).
To prevent the attempts of the attack script, the system
denies all access from the User Agents generated by program-
ming such as CURL. The high-risk extensions such as .php
and .exe are also banned in the form submission, i.e., upload
filtering. For multiple requests from the same IP, after three
failed login attempts, the CAPTCHA is activated to prevent
the automated hacks effectively. All the blocked attempts are
traced for further analysis if necessary.
For the website requiring a stricter protection policy, we
can disable the features of installing new components/add-ons,
or the owner must verify such installation requests manually.
Another important policy is to disallow local and remote file
inclusion. The former vulnerability, called directory traversal
technique (such as controller=../../../etc/passwd), may allow
an attacker to read sensitive files by exploiting poorly coded
extensions while the latter one means the access to URLs (such
as controller=http://www.virus.com/exploit.txt) that may let an
attacker to download and run malicious scripts by exploiting
poorly coded extensions.
For the Web requests that target to mount a potential DDoS
attack, the system activates the CAPTCHA after getting HTTP
requests over a threshold in a short time, e.g., 200 per second.
Only the access passing the CAPTCHA check can go ahead.
Also, if the website is not a global site, i.e., targeting only
domestic visitors, the blocking can prohibit all IPs that appear
to be from selected countries. However, we must include
exceptions of IPs for legitimate requests from servers such
as search engines [15] and spam/blacklist check. The list of
Geo IPs for the blocking-by-country function can be found at
[22].
Blacklist explosion avoidance Unlike distributed denial of
service attacks (DDoS), the source used in this web attack
may not exceed thousands, i.e., the IP which attacker used to
evade the IP block. In practice, the attacker may launch the
spoofing attacks, e.g., non-existing source IP, to overwhelm the
blacklist storage. To defeat this exploitation, we can request a
valid confirmation of the source and valid browser agent before
accepting a post HTTP request. For the websites requiring
high performance, we use a Bloom Filter [16] to query rapidly
6and memory-efficiently whether the hash of incoming HTTP
request presents in the existing hash patterns. Other matching
methods can be found at [17], [18].
IV. EYEING ON ABNORMAL ACTIVITIES
As we mentioned, the passive and data-centric searching
system above relies much on detecting the malicious codes
from the Web requests. However, several Web requests may
bypass the scanning engine. In that case, an active monitor is
essential to detect and isolate the spreading of malicious scripts
timely. Thus, unlike the scanning process on the received
data of the passive prevention engine, this script actively
monitors the abnormal activity (behavior-centric) on the server.
The events can be in a high frequency (over a threshold) of
generating new links or external queries to the other IPs. Note
that the monitor also keeps eyes on the actions of copying and
modifying the core files, i.e., refer the hashed list.
A. Identifying the Web-server abuse behavior and classifica-
tion
Each malicious activity often has several unique character-
istics to detect. To differentiate between benign and malicious
activities, we define the following features: the execute time of
the script, the number of outgoing messages by protocols(e.g.,
SMTP). While the first feature can be used to monitor the
resource abuse(long execution for a specific script), the second
one is useful to catch the abnormal behavior of sending a
large number of phishing emails (enormous SMTP requests).
Fig. 12 illustrates the real-time monitoring of such features.
The hosting Cpanel may have a similar function in collecting
these features. The additional patterns for analyzing HTTP
requests can be found in [19].
Fig. 12. The real-time monitoring of outgoing messages by protocols
After we extract the features, we need to classify whether
they are malicious or benign. We use a decision tree, e.g.,
[20], with the features described above. The major advantage
of using decision tree lies in the interpret-ability and human
validation of the learned models. The advanced classification
can be found in [23], [24].
B. Implementation
Due to the limitation of intervention to the setting
and server-script on the shared-hosting servers, particularly,
Apache/Nginx, the system is preferably implemented in PHP
but not limited to. Using the server-script language of the
websites has significant advantages in deploying or integrating
to the CMS (friendly-usage) or a standalone (if accessing
the injected sites is impossible). For the system with more
flexible control privilege, e.g., a dedicated server, the active
and behavior-centric monitor is written in Python and can run
as an independent process in memory.
As a result of the comprehensive approach, our system suc-
cessfully rescues a set of injected websites and has effectively
protected them. Fig. 13 shows that the automated attack script
is still working and trying to attack our sites again but fails
thanks to the reliable protection of our system. Because our
website IPs are already stored in the attackers database at
the first successful attack, new attack attempts will continue,
unless the botnet handling these scripts is taken down.
Fig. 13. The system can detect and prevent the attack attempts from various
IP addresses
Regarding the abnormal activity monitoring, the activities of
the high Web server resource usage (as illustrated in Fig. 14)
– found by our classification – are further checked whether
they come from the scripts or the links inside the hashed list,
including the original sitemap. If there is an exception, e.g., the
heavy executing script is not in the hashed list or an abnormal
increase of SMTP messages, a detail notification of the path
of the file and what it does will be sent to the administrator.
Fig. 14. The illustration of CPU Usage behavior monitoring. For the heavy
executing scripts (high CPU usage), a detail notification of the path of the
scripts and what they do will be sent to the administrator.
V. CONCLUSION
Through the above analysis, we are willing to demonstrate
the attack attempts and tactics of the attackers in making
money on compromised websites. A website that is blocked
and not used for earning money does not mean the end of its
life. There are probably thousands of such injected websites.
We believe that as more such sites have been successfully
taken down by the anti-phishing services and our security
protection, the attacker is likely to change the attack tactics.
The fight between the defender and the attacker can be
7considered as in a tit-for-tat battle, and the former player is
not easy to win, i.e., preventing all the attacks. To not be
lost in such struggle, our detection and prevention system
is periodically updated with the new regex patterns and the
hashed list for specific cases, e.g., the developer of the website
may scan and confirm what files they have modified or what
components to be added to the hashed list. We hope that this
revealing effort may benefit security favor readers, even place
a brick of potential awareness of how the security rapidly shifts
in world wide web.
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